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CORRESPONDENCE
CONSTITUTIONAL FACT AND THEORY:
A RESPONSE TO CIDEF JUDGE POSNER
Deborah Jones Merritt*
In his James Madison Lecture on Constitutional Law, Chief
Judge Richard Posner chides both professors and judges for devot
ing too much attention to constitutional theory and too little time to
empiricism.1 Although I agree with Judge Posner's endorsement of
empiricism, I dispute the roles he assigns empiricism and theory.
Social science matters when interpreting the Constitution, but not
in the way Posner posits. Facts cannot replace constitutional theo
ries, nor can they mechanically resolve questions posed by theory.
Instead, empirical knowledge is most useful in unmasking the theo
retical assumptions that undergird c.onstitutional law, in focusing
those theories, and in contributing to a multidimensional view of
society that informs the substance of constitutional law. In this cor
respondence, I will examine the flaws in Judge Posner's attempt to
substitute empiricism for constitutional theory. I will then explore
three more constructive roles that empiricism can play in constitu
tional law.
Posner centers his critique of theoretical decisionmaking on the
Supreme Court's 1996 decision in United States v. Virginia. 2 There,
the Court held that Virginia violated the Equal Protection Clause
by "reserving exclusively to men the unique educational opportuni
ties" of the Virginia Military Institute.3 Posner complains that the
Court reached this result by ignoring empirical evidence about the
small number of women qualified for or interested in VMI's highly
disciplined format. Close examination of Posner's protest, how* John Deaver Drinko-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State University.
A.B. 1977, Harvard; J.D. 1980, Columbia.- Ed. James Brudney, Mark Killenbeck, Andrew
Merritt, Barbara Reskin, and participants at a workshop on constitutional theory and empiri
cism held at the Georgetown University Law Center provided helpful comments on this
essay.

1. See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 {1998).
2. 518 U.S. 515 {1996). Posner also criticizes Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 {1996),
although more summarily. Posner's errors in discussing Romer are similar to those in his
treatment of United States v. Virginia. Because Posner focuses most of his fire on the Virginia
decision, I concentrate on that case as well.
3. See Virginia, 518 U. S. at 519.
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ever, reveals that Posner disagrees with the Court's theory of the
Equal Protection Clause - not with its understanding of the facts.
Facts, in Virginia as in other cases, have no life without theory.
Posner begins his lament by quoting the Court's observation
that "'neither [VMI's] goal of producing citizen-soldiers nor [its]
implementing methodology is inherently unsuitable to women."'4
With undisguised glee, Posner then demands: "How does the Court
know?"5 Here, it seems, is an empirically testable assumption that
the Court has failed to verify. How can the Court bar operation of
VMI as a male-only institution when it has no proof that women are
capable of becoming citizen-soldiers or surviving VMI's rigorous
training program.?6
Posner's empirical question masks an essential theoretical as
sumption.7 Posner's theory of the Constitution holds that all nonju
dicial government action is presumptively valid: a plaintiff
challenging government action must demonstrate the invalidity of
that action and satisfy a high burden of proof. The State of Vir4. Posner, supra note 1, at 13 (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520).
5. Id.
6. Although I focus on theoretical defects in Posner's argument, even his fact-based chal
lenge is oddly misplaced. The Supreme Court's conclusion that neither VMI's goals nor its
pedagogy was "inherently unsuitable to women" paralleled an identical determination in the
court of appeals. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 525 (quoting 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992)).
Both conclusions, in turn, drew upon six days of trial-court testimony dominated by "an array
of expert witnesses on each side." 518 U.S. at 523. This testimony established that "[s]ome
women, at least, would want to attend [VMI] if they had the opportunity," that "some
women . . . are capable of all of the individual activities required of VMI cadets," and that
"some women can meet the physical standards [VMI] now impose[s] on men." 518 U.S. at
540-41 (all but first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting find
ings of fact from the lower courts). Indeed, VMI's own expert on educational institutions
acknowledged: "I'm not saying that some women don't do well under [the] adversative
model [used by VMI], undoubtedly there are some [women] who do." 518 U.S. at 541 (first
and third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting district court
opinion). The VMI trial, therefore, seems to have included exactly the type of empirical
evidence Posner seeks.
Late in his lecture, Posner acknowledges that some women might qualify for VMI's train
ing - although without noting that expert testimony in the trial court established just this
fact Even so, Posner suggests, the small number of qualified women compared to qualified
men justified Virginia's decision to select candidates based on sex; it would be inefficient for
the state to test women individually. See Posner, supra note 1, at 15. On this point, as on the
others I discuss, Posner simply disagrees with the Supreme Court's theory of the Equal Pro
tection Clause. The Court repeatedly has held that sex, like race, should not serve as a proxy
for qualifications that can be tested individually. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
7. As a prelude to his critique, Posner attempts to draw a distinction between constitu
tional "theory" and "doctrine." See Posner, supra note 1, at 1-4. This distinction, like the
attempt to distinguish theory and empiricism, is problematic. Even accepting Posner's
theory/doctrine distinction, however, the assumption masked by his empirical question is a
theoretical one. It is an overarching view of how judges should confront constitutional ques
tions, incorporating (as many constitutional theories do) Posner's own perspective on the
proper role of the judiciary in a democratic society.
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ginia, Posner reasons, concluded that women were unsuited for ca
reers as citizen-soldiers or study at VMI; any challenger must prove
the opposite.
The Justices on the contemporary Supreme Court, however, be
lieve that the Equal Protection Clause mandates a different burden
of proof when the state distinguishes citizens on the basis of sex.
The state must justify the distinction, and that justification must be
"exceedingly persuasive."8 Posner is entitled to disagree with the
Supreme Court's theory of the Equal Protection Clause; some peo
ple do. The point, however, is that Posner's disagreement is theo
retical, not empirical. Posner wants the Court to stay its hand
unless it is very sure that women will benefit from VMI's training.
But the Court believes that the Equal Protection Clause forbids ex
plicit gender distinctions unless the state can advance a substantial
justification for them. The dispute lies in the realm of theory, not
fact.
The theoretical disagreement emerges even more clearly when
Posner restates the controversy underlying Virginia.

"The issue,"

Posner concludes, "as it would appear to a disinterested student of
public policy unburdened by commitment to any of the constitu
tional theories, is whether excluding women from VMI is likely to
do more harm to women . . . than including them would do to the
mission of training citizen-soldiers."9 This deceptively simple state
ment, which Posner finds so self-evident, illuminates the theoretical
gulf between the Court and him. Under Posner's formulation of the
issue in VMI, a plaintiff challenging intentional, state-mandated sex
distinctions must prove that the distinctions do more harm to
women than they do good for the state. Posner's Equal Protection
Clause is a balance on which even equipoise favors discrimination.
As long as the harm to women is no greater than the benefits the
state hopes to achieve, discrimination is permissible. Posner's "dis
interested student of public policy" seems unburdened, not only by
"any of the constitutional theories," but by the Fourteenth Amend
ment itself.
Posner himself finally admits that he cannot abandon constitu
tional theory in posing empirical questions.10 He even admits that
8. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524, 531; J.E.B. v.Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S.127, 13 6-37 &
n.6 (1994); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
9. Posner, supra note 1, at 16.
10. See id. at 18 ("I never meant to suggest that it is possible to approach constitutional
issues free from any predispositions, free, that is, from an approach, or if you will, a theory.").
The concession, however, appears late in the lecture and Posner treats it briefly.
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his theory of constitutional law is a spartan one that permits judicial
intervention only when the challenged government action is truly
"outrageous."11 Such a theory is fully consistent with imposing a
heavy burden of proof on challengers to any government action.
Posner's theory just isn't the theory espoused by a majority of the
current Supreme Court - at least not in cases involving express sex
discrimination.
If Posner concedes that he cannot dispense with theory, then
what is the point of his tirade "against constitutional theory"? It is,
I think, an attempt to disguise theoretical difference as commitment
to empirical fact. This is a dangerous use of empiricism. By sug
gesting that he has eschewed theory in favor of empirical inquiry,
Posner deflects attention from his own theoretical assumptions. He
tempts the reader to accept his outrage theory, which is quite differ
ent from the modern Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, by implying that his conclusions depend upon undisputed
facts, not controverted theories. Yet Posner's resolution of the
VMI controversy delivers just as much theory as any conference of
law professors.
Posner's approach misleads on a second level. Throughout his
lecture, he raises a single empirical question about VMI's admis
sions policy, insisting that resolution of the controversy required
more knowledge "about the role of women in the military."12 Even
if empirical inquiry could resolve the VMI case, why is this the only
question, or even the most important one? Just :fifteen percent of
VMI's graduates entered the military; the rest succeeded in busi
ness, law, politics, and other professions.13 The school's endow
ment reflected the material success of its alumni. VMI enjoyed
"the largest per-student endowment of all public undergraduate in
stitutions in the Nation."14 VMI students, moreover, depended
upon the school's loyal alumni network to secure influential posi
tions in the civilian sector.15 United States v. Virginia was not a dis
pute over women in combat; it was a challenge to a state
government that invested heavily in educating men for business and
political leadership, that succeeded admirably in this endeavor, and
that rigorously limited its special training to men.
11. See id. at 18 ("I happen to belong to what I earlier described as the school of 'outrage'
. . . ."); id. at 4-6 {describing further the "outrage" school of constitutional theory).
12. See id. at 22.
13. See Virginia, 518 U. S. at 520, 522.
14. 518 U. S. at 520.
15. See 518 U.S. at 552-53.
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Anyone who has seriously attempted empirical work knows that
framing the question is as important as finding the answer. In sci
ence, as in law, the questioner has considerable power to control
the reply. By suggesting that resolution of the VMI controversy
depended on a single empirical question, and that the question was
obvious to any examiner, Judge Posner does a second disservice to
genuine empirical inquiry. The Supreme Court posed and an
swered many empirical questions in United States v. Virginia: What
benefits did VMI confer on its male graduates? Djd the state pro
vide comparable opportunities for women? Were some women ca
pable of surviving VMI's rigorous training? The questions were not
all ones that Posner wants to ask.16 But empiricism offers no stan
dard for selecting questions; only theory does that.

If Posner's empiricism is misdirected, is there a better way to use
empirical science in constitutional law? Ironically, Posner's misuse
of empiricism points the way to three more constructive uses of so
cial science in constitutional litigation.17
First, the process of empirical exploration unmasks constitu
tional theory. Facts cannot be gathered without asking questions.
Demanding empiricism in constitutional law, therefore, requires
judges and scholars to formulate research questions. As my brief
review of Posner's lecture demonstrates, empirical questions may
reveal an author's theoretical assumptions more tellingly than do
pages of declarative text. One cannot ask for data without sug
gesting that the data are relevant. Once the questions have been
posed, one must also decide how much evidence is needed and who

will bear the burden of production. Just as Posner's empirical ques
tions about the VMI decision disclose his narrow interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause, empirical queries by other theorists
unveil their unarticulated assumptions. Empirical inquiry cannot
replace constitutional theory, but it can illuminate the half-hidden
theories that guide decisionmakers. In that role, empiricism is a
useful adjunct to theory.
Second, social science discoveries can influence the substance of
constitutional theory - although not in the simple, direct manner
many commentators suppose. Some advocates of empiricism imply
that judges confronted with constitutional controversies can find
16. Notably, while Posner does raise the last of these questions, the extensive trial court
testimony yielded a different answer than the one he prefers. See supra note 6.
17. Social science may fill roles beyond these three. For example, I do not discuss here
the role of social science in legitimating constitutional decisions. The three roles I feature
here, however, are the ones I consider most important for constitutional theorists and judges
using social science.
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answers to those disputes in the pages of social science journals.
Posner himself approaches this position by heavily endorsing em
piricism over constitutional theory and by suggesting that
"[u]ltimately many of the uncertainties [in constitutional law] may
be dispelled" by empirical knowledge.18
Any attempt to rely exclusively, or even primarily, upon social
science to answer constitutional questions is likely to generate bad
science and bad law. The Supreme Court has a rather poor record
in this regard - even in answering relatively concrete constitu
tional questions. During the 1970s, for example, the Court had to
decide the constitutionality of six-member criminal and civil ju
ries.19 Neither constitutional text nor history resolved the conun

drum, so the Court adopted a functional view of the constitutional
rights to trial by "jury" and turned to social science to determine
whether a six-member jury functioned in the same manner as a
twelve-member one.20
The Court's dismal performance has been chronicled elsewhere.

It cited "studies" that were simply assertions or news reports, in
voked other studies with serious methodological flaws, and even re
lied on works reaching the opposite conclusion from the one stated
by the Court.21 As Michael Saks has written, "[t]he quality of social
science scholarship displayed in [the jury-size] decisions would not
win a passing grade in a high school psychology class."22
It is tempting to solve this problem simply by imploring the
Court to work harder at getting the social science right. Indeed, the
Court did improve its performance when evaluating the constitu
tionality of five-member juries in criminal trials. In that case, the
Court even intimated regret at its poor showing in the original jury
size cases.23 The courts, however, face substantial barriers in at
tempting to answer constitutional questions with social science:
judges are not trained in the scientific method, they depend upon
equally untrained parties to present empirical evidence, and the so
cial science itself too often is flawed and malleable. Human beings
18. See Posner, supra note 1, at 22.
19. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (criminal trials); Colgrove v. Battin, 413
U.S. 149 (1973) (civil trials).
20. See Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 157-59; Williams, 399 U.S. at 99-102.
21. See Michael J. Saks, Ignorance of Science Is No Excuse, TRIAL, Nov./Dec. 1974, at 18,
18-19.
22. Id. at 18.
23. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 237-39 & n.30 (1978) (noting methodological
problems with jury-size studies, as well as the Court's reliance on some of those flawed stud
ies in Colgrove).

·
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and the societies they form are too complex and changeable to
generate precise social science answers to constitutional
controversies.24
Empirical studies, in other words, can't resolve constitutional is
sues in the way that an almanac tells us the year in which Halley's
Comet will next appear or the population of Wisconsin.25 Social
science offers no answer key for constitutional questions. But em
pirical work does contribute significantly to the broader social
knowledge that informs constitutional theory. Social science find
ings help shape judges' and theorists' views of the world around
them, and often challenge deeply held beliefs about that world. As
our understanding of society shifts, new social perceptions some
times produce new constitutional meaning.26
This was the true role of social science in Brown

v.

Board of

Education.21 The nine Justices who rendered that historic opinion

surely did not fashion a neutral empirical question - can separate
ever be equal? - and then scan the social science literature for an
answer. Instead, they most likely reached a social conclusion, that
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal,"28 through
a complex intellectual journey. The journey may have included
.
personal observation of racial interactions, reflection on their own
educational experience and that of their children, consideration of
contemporary and historical accounts of segregation, fresh memo
ries of a war in which odious racial classifications figured promi
nently, philosophical musing about the nature of equality,
resolution of prior challenges to the separate-but-equal doctrine in
higher education, and examination of a growing body of social sci
ence literature documenting the effects of segregation. Social sci
ence was but one of several strands weaving a picture of an unequal
24. For a similar argument that social science may inform legal decisionmaking but can
not directly determine the content of legal doctrine, see Edward L. Rubin, Law And and the
Methodology of Law, 1997 Wis. L. RE.v. 521.
25. Recent controversies over the U. S. census cast doubt even on the certainty of the
latter social fact. See Department of Co=erce v.United States House of Representatives,
67 U. S. L.W. 4090 (U. S. Jan. 25, 1999); WISconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1 (1996). If
we cannot count the number of people inhabiting a state witllout controversy, how can we
hope to generate clear answers to tlle hundreds of social questions informing constitutional
law?
26. Carol Weiss and Michael Bucuvalas refer to a similar "enlightenment" function of
social science research. See CAROL H. WEISS & MICHAEL J. BucuvALAs, SOCIAL SCIENCE
REsEARCH AND DECISION-MAKING (1980); Carol H. Weiss, Broadening the Concept of Re
search Utilization, Soc. SYMP., Wmter 1978, at 20; see also Richard Lempert, "Between Cup
and Lip": Social Science Influences on Law and Policy, 10 L. & POLY. 167, 183-85 (1988)
(discussing tlle "conceptual" or "enlightenment" functions of social science).
27. 347 U. S. 483 (1954).

28. 347 U. S. at 495.
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American society. The composite picture pushed the Justices to
embrace a new constitutional theory.29
This indirect, ensemble role of social science does not diminish
its importance. On the contrary, contributions by social scientists
can be crucial to resolving constitutional issues. Social science vig
orously challenges the power of individual, anecdotal conviction.
Good empirical work forces us to step outside of our own experi
ence and examine the world from a different perspective. Acquir
ing that viewpoint greatly enriches constitutional theory. Although
social science cannot directly answer constitutional queries, it can
alter social perceptions. Those perceptions, in turn, help forge con
stitutional theory.
A third role for social science lies in creating a dialogue between
legal theorists and social researchers. Social science is an ongoing
exploration, not a singular destination. Answering one question
about social behavior generates half a dozen further inquiries. In
part this is because society changes, and social science attempts to
ascertain both what is and what can be. Social scientists, moreover,
understand that most human behavior is contextual; a change in
circumstances often varies behavior.
The open-ended nature of social science inquiries can help con
stitutional thinkers refine their theories. In the jury-size cases, for
example, the Supreme Court posited that a jury's primary function
is to prevent government oppression.30 This function, the Court
thought, can be served as long as a jury includes sufficient members
to permit group deliberation and to represent a cross section of the
community.31 The Court then turned to existing social science liter
ature to determine whether six-member juries serve these functions
as well as twelve-member ones.
This attempt to consult an existing body of social science re
search led to the poor results described above. If, however, the
Court had been able to engage social scientists in a longer dialogue
over jury size, the outcome might have been more promising. So
cial researchers, for example, could have pressed the Court to de
fine what it meant by "group deliberation." Does the number of
words spoken by each group member matter, or is it the power of
one or two dissenters to tum the decisional tide?

Researchers

could also have asked what constitutes an adequate "cross section"
29. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Future of Bakke: Will Social Science Matter? 59
Omo ST. L.J. 1055 (1998) {further discussing the role of social science in deciding Brown).
30. See Williams

v.

Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 {1970).

31. See 399 U.S. at 100.
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of the community. Should a minority composing ten percent of the
community be represented on every jury, or on three quarters of
those juries? Will representation on less than half of the juries suf
fice?32 The dialogue might also have prompted the Court to re
examine some aspects of jury performance that it took for
granted.33 The questions generated by social science, in other
words, would have been as important as the answers in pressing the
Court to refine its theory of the jury.
Courts, of course, have little capacity to engage in constructive
dialogue. Once a controversy reaches a panel of judges, it must be
decided.34 This third function of social science in constitutional law,
therefore, promises a special place for academics. By engaging so
cial scientists in an ongoing dialogue on social issues, constitutional
theorists could broaden our understanding of the social context in
forming the Constitution and also sharpen interpretations of that
document.

Legal theorists working with social scientists could

deepen both social knowledge and constitutional theory in the
years before judges must resolve a controversy.

I end, therefore, with a plea that Chief Judge Posner would en
dorse: Constitutional theorists should pay more <l;ttention to social
science. Empiricism won't replace theory; it won't even answer
most of the controverted questions. But empiricism will expose the
preconceptions underlying constitutional theory, it will stimulate
new questions about those theories, and it will enrich the cultural
understanding that informs all constitutional law. If empiricism
succeeds on these three fronts, it will amply reward the constitu
tional scholars and judges who pursue it.

32. See Saks, supra note 21, at 19 (noting that in a population with a 10% minority group,
72 % of twelve·member juries will include at least one of those minority members, while only
47% of six-member juries will do so).
33. For example, the Court's assumption that "the reliability of the jury as a factfinder
hardly seems likely to be a function of its size," Williams, 399 U. S. at 100-01, proved dubious.
See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-35 (1978) (citing empirical studies).
34. Techniques judges use to avoid or limit constitutional decisions can play an important
role in continuing dialogue over social issues. Even under these circumstances, however, the
court defers decision so that others may continue the dialogue.

